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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, Case No. 20020952-SC 
v. Ct. App. No. 20000340-CA 
WAYNE WALLACE DEAN, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This Court granted certiorari to review the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in 
State v. Dean, 2002 UT App 323, 57 P.3d 1106 (Addendum A), which reversed the 
district court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated§ 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 
2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. A defendant may not challenge plea proceedings directly on appeal, but is 
required to file a motion to withdraw his plea and, if the motion is denied, appeal from 
that denial. Where a defendant's motion to withdraw is denied and he appeals, is the 
scope of appellate review limited to the trial court's denial of the motion, or may the 
appellate court also review the plea hearing for error not presented in the motion to 
withdraw? 
This is a question of law, and review is for correctness. See Franklin Covey Client 
Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, ~~ 18-19, 2 P.3d 451 (addressing scope of 
review when appeal challenges grant or denial of a motion). 
2. In taking defendant's plea, the trial court explained that the plea waived the 
right to a trial by jury. Did the trial court err by not specifying that the plea waived the 
right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury? 
The is also a qu_e~tion of law, and review is for c •rrectness. B ,)wn v. Glover, 
2000 UT 89, ~ 15, 16 P.3d 540 (interpreting procedural rule). 
3. If error occurred, was it plain, where no settled appellate law made it obvious 
and where defendant made no showing of harm? 
To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must show that error occurred, that it 
should have been obvious to the trial court, and that he was prejudiced because of the 
error. State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, ~ 16, 20 P.3d 888. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statute and rule. set forth in Addendum B, are relevant to this 
petition: 
Utah Code Annotated§ 77-13-6 (1999), and 
Utah R. Crim. P. ll(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of child abuse, a second degree felony; two 
counts of child abuse, a class A misdemeanor; commission of domestic violence in the 
presence of a child, a class A misdemeanor; assault, a class B misdemeanor; and threat 
against life or property, a class B misdemeanor. R. 1-4. 
On March 8, 2000, defendant pled guilty to one count of child abuse, a second 
degree felony; one count of child abuse, a class A misdemeanor; and assault, a class B 
misdemeanor. R. 25. In connection with his plea, defendant executed a statement that 
included a paragraph describing each of the rights detailed in rule 11 (e), Utah R. Crim. P. 
R. 29-3 5. The paragraph detailing defendant's right to a trial advised him of his right to a 
jury trial or, should he elect to waive that right, to a trial by the court. R. 34-35. The 
paragraph did not include the phrases "speedy trial" and "impartial jury." R. 34. The 
statement also advised defendant that a motion to withdraw his guilty plea had to be made 
within thirty days of the entry of the plea and would be granted only upon a showing of 
good cause. R. 32. Before accepting his guilty plea, the trial court asked defendant 
whether he had read the statement. R. 71:3. Defendant answered affirmatively. !d. 
3 
On April 10, 2000, the day before sentencing, defendant filed a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. R. 39-40. He argued that the trial court had failed to strictly 
comply with rule 11 in two ways. He first argued that he had not been advised of the time 
limit for filing a motion to withdraw his plea. R. 43 (Memorandum in Support, Point II). 
The trial court had, however, advised him of the thirty-day deadline. R. 32. Defendant 
did not specify the basis for the second violation. R. 43-44 (Memorandum in Support, 
Point I). He alleged that there were "two significant departures from procedures [used to 
ensure] ... due process and[/]or equal protection under the law," but did not indicate 
what those departures were. R. 43. 
On April 11, the prosecutor filed a response, arguing that "Mr. Oliver did nothing 
to reasonably research t~e facts surrounding the entry of ... defendant's guilty plea" and 
that the motion was frivolous. R. 49. 
That same day, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing. R. 45-47. The 
motion to withdraw was discussed during the hearing, but the record does not indicate 
that defendant gave any further information about the unspecified errors being claimed. 
/d. The court denied defendant's motion to withdraw because defendant had not shown 
good cause and pronounced sentence. R. 46, 48-53. An April 17, the court filed its 
judgment, sentence, and commitment. R. 56-57. 
Defendant timely appealed his conviction. R. 59, 62, 64. He argued, for the first 
time on appeal, that the trial court committed plain error because he had not been advised 
of his right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury. Dean, 2002 UT App 323 at~ 10. 
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The court of appeals agreed, reversed the denial of the motion to withdraw, and vacated 
defendant's conviction. !d. at~ 13. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
As defendant pled guilty and no trial was held, the statement of the facts is taken 
from the "Official Version of the Offense" and other information in the Pre-Sentence 
Investigation Report (PSI). See PSI. 
In January 2000, defendant repeatedly punched his dying, then 85-pound wife in 
the stomach with a closed fist. Jd. at 2-4. When defendant's eleven-year-old son heard 
his mother screaming for help, he tried to stop defendant and give his mother some 
ibuprofen and wine. !d. Defendant then grabbed the boy by the neck and tried to choke 
him, telling the boy not to touch the ibuprofen or the wine. Jd. Defendant said, "[D]on't 
touch that or I'll break your hands." !d. at 4. A friend of the child observed the incident 
and corroborated the boy's account. Jd. Defendant's wife died the following day. !d. at 
2. 
This incident was only one in defendant's long history of physically abusing his 
wife and children. !d. at 1-5, 9-10. During the year preceding the January 2000 beating 
of his dying wife, defendant got drunk, heated a knife on the stove, and placed it in his 
fifteen-year-old daughter's pierced and infected belly button. !d. at 3. He characterized 
this act as an attempt "to cauterize it." !d. While picking his daughter up at a football 
game that same year, defendant backhanded her across the face approximately ten times, 
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blackening both of her eyes. !d. In addition, defendant's wife left a journal with entries 
from 1991 through 1994, describing how defendant repeatedly beat her. !d. at 9-10. 
On approximately February 4, 2000, an Adult Probation and Parole investigator 
conducted a field visit at defendant's residence in connection with defendant's supervised 
probation. !d. at 2. Defendant had been drinking alcohol in violation of his parole, and 
was taken into custody. !d. At the time of defendant's arrest, defendant's son told a 
police officer about the incident the day bef<_>re his mother's death. !d. The children were 
subsequently interviewed and gave additional details about defendant's abuse. !d. The 
children both indicated that they were afraid of their father. !d. at 3-4. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. A defendant ~ay not directly appeal a conviction based on a guilty plea. 
Instead, he must move to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court. If his motion is 
denied for failure to show "good cause," he may appeal the denial of his motion. He can 
prevail on appeal if he can show that the trial court abused its discretion because it denied 
the motion despite a showing of "good cause" to permit withdrawal. 
Appellate review, however, is limited to the proceedings of the trial court in 
denying the motion to withdraw. The appellate court may only determine whether the 
court abused its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw. A defendant may not file 
an appeal ostensibly challenging the denial of a motion to withdraw, but then on appeal 
seek review of the plea hearing. To do so would render the requirement for a motion to 
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withdraw perfunctory. Defendant may obtain review for plain error committed in the 
motion hearing, but not the plea hearing. 
2. A trial court strictly complies with mle 11 when it advises a defendant, prior to 
accepting his guilty plea, that the plea will waive his right to trial by jury, even if the trial 
court does not specify that the right waived is the right to a speedy trial by an impartial 
JUry. 
3. If a failure to specify speedy and impartial is error, it does not constitute plain 
error where, at the time of trial, no settled appellate law required the use of the terms. 
Further, it does not constitute plain error where a defendant makes no demonstration of 
harm-where he neither alleges nor shows a probability that he would not have pled 
guilty but for the trial court's omission of the words. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW A GUILTY PLEA IS LIMITED TO THE TRIAL 
COURT'S PROCEEDINGS ON THE MOTION; AN APPELLATE 
COURT EXCEEDS THE PROPER SCOPE OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
WHEN IT ALSO REVIEWS THE PLEA HEARING FOR ERROR NOT 
PRESENTED IN THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
Utah case law establishes that a defendant may not directly appeal a conviction 
based on a guilty plea. If a defendant believes that error occurred in the plea-taking 
process, he must file a motion to withdraw. If the trial court denies the motion and if a 
defendant believes that the denial of the motion constitutes an abuse of discretion, he may 
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appeal the denial. To prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion when it 
denied the motion to withdraw, he must show that the trial court unreasonably denied his 
motion. 
Further, a defendant could prevail on a plain error claim if he could show that the 
that "good cause" should have been obvious to the trial court ruling on his motion to 
withdraw. But no obvious error occurs in a trial court's proceedings on the motion to 
withdraw simply because error occurred at an earlier plea-taking. 
Defendant here filed a motion to withdraw. He then brought an appeal, ostensibly 
challenging the denial ofhis motion to withdraw. Instead of focusing on the denial of his 
motion to withdraw, however, defendant attacked the plea-taking, arguing that the trial 
court committed error f!~t in denying his motion to withdraw, but in taking his plea. The 
court of appeals erred when it entertained this claim, which was outside the scope of 
appellate review. 
A. Background 
Defendant was represented at his March 8, 2000 plea-taking by public defender 
Dale W. Sessions. R. 25. Sentencing was set for April 11, 2000. /d. On April 10, 2000, 
D. Bruce Oliver entered an appearance of counsel and filed a motion to withdraw 
defendant's guilty plea. R. 38-40. In his memorandum in support of the motion to 
withdraw, Mr. Oliver alleged defendant had not been advised of the time limits for 
withdrawing his guilty plea. R. 43. He further alleged that the plea had been taken in 
violation of rule 11, stating that "there are two significant departures from procedures 
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which have been used by the courts to ensure a person due process and[/]or equal 
protection under the law." !d. He did not indicate what those departures were. He did 
not attach a copy of the plea affidavit, a transcript of the plea-taking, or any other record 
material in which the court may have found plea-taking error, had error occurred. 
Although Mr. Oliver entered an appearance, Mr. Sessions did not withdraw as 
counsel. Sentencing was held on April 11, 2000, with Mr. Sessions, but not Mr. Oliver, 
present. R. 45-47. The minutes note that Mr. Sessions had received Mr. Oliver's 
paperwork. !d. at 46. The minutes do not state whether argument was held on the motion 
to withdraw. 1 !d. The minutes, together with other record documents, do indicate that the 
court denied the motion to withdraw because ( 1) defendant had not shown good cause and 
(2) the motion was unti~ely.2 R. 46, 48-53. 
1Nothing in the minutes suggests that Mr. Sessions, who had not prepared the 
motion to withdraw, argued anything at all in support of the motion, let alone detailed the 
nature of the alleged unspecified error. 
2Defendant' s motion was untimely under then-controlling precedent requiring that 
a defendant make his motion within thirty days following the plea-taking. See State v. 
Price, 837 P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1992) (overntled by State v. Ostler (Ostler II), 2001 UT 
68, ~ 11, 31 P.3d 528). Defendant's motion would apparently be timely, however, under 
precedent established in the interim. See Ostler II, 2001 UT 68 at~ 11 (holding that the 
30-day limitation runs from the date of final judgment). The State did not argue on 
appeal that the motion was untimely. The trial court denied the motion for two reasons: 
(1) because it was untimely, and (2) because defendant had not shown good cause. Either 
reason was, by itself, sufficient to support the trial court's denial. 
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B. Relevant case law establishes that appellate review of the denial of a motion to 
withdraw is limited to an examination of the trial court's actions in denying 
the motion. 
A review of the relevant case law begins with State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, 40 P.3d 
630. In Reyes, this Court held that section 77-13-6 (1999), Utah Code Annotated, 
requires a defendant to file a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea. !d. at~ 3. Failure 
to file the motion extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge the validity of the guilty 
plea on appeal. !d. 
This Court's earlier decisions regarding appellate challenges to guilty pleas are 
consistent. In State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1993), this Court also declined to 
address a defendant's argument that error occurred in the plea-taking. !d. at 1066. This 
Court reasoned, "The State asserts that the issue is not properly before this Court because 
Johnson did not move to withdraw his guilty plea in the district court. We agree. A 
defendant is obliged to seek a trial court's ruling on an issue before the issue can be raised 
in an appellate court." !d. 
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), the case where this Court first 
articulated the "strict compliance" doctrine, the defendant claimed that his guilty plea was 
entered in violation of rule 11 (then a statute) and due process. !d. at 1311. Noting that 
defendant had not filed a motion to withdraw and that the then-applicable plea statute set 
no time limit for filing a motion to withdraw, the Court remanded the case to the district 
court to allow defendant to file a motion to withdraw. !d. Thus, the Court declined to 
address any direct challenge to the plea-taking. 
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In Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341 (Utah App. 1988), the court of appeals 
addressed the Gibbons decision, observing that "[i]n Gibbons, the Supreme Court 
determined that a defendant could not simply appeal a conviction based on a guilty plea." 
/d. at 342. "Rather, [a] defendant must first file a motion to withdraw [the] plea, giving 
the court who took the plea the first chance to consider [the] the defendant's arguments." 
Jd. Then, "(i]fthe motion is denied, defendant could ... appeal-not from the conviction 
per se, but from the denial of the motion to withdraw. "3 !d. 
These cases thus establish that a defendant cannot challenge error in his 
plea-taking directly on appeal. He can only challenge error in his plea-taking by filing a 
motion to withdraw. If the trial court then denies the,motion to withdraw, the defendant 
can appeal the denial of the motion to withdraw. 
In other words, a defendant can raise on appeal any error the trial court committed 
in its disposition of the motion to withdraw. If a defendant did in fact demonstrate "good 
cause" for the withdrawal of his plea and if the trial court therefore abused its discretion 
in denying the motion, or if the court committed plain error in denying the motion, a 
3By contrast, the Summers court held, a defendant may bring a collateral attack on 
the plea itself, but the defendant must meet the standards for habeas review. Summers, 
759 P.2d at 343. "[T]o successfully attack a guilty plea collaterally, a petitioner must 
demonstrate an obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional 
right in the reception of the plea and show cause why he or she took no direct appeal." 
!d. 
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defendant may be entitled to relief on appeal.'~ But the scope of appellate review is 
limited to review of the denial of the motion to withdraw. 
C. The court of appeals erred by addressing claims that the trial court erred, not 
in denying the motion to withdraw, but in taking the plea. 
In this case, the court of appeals did not examine the proceedings of the trial court 
in acting on the motion to withdraw. Dean, 2002 UT App 323 at~~ 10-12. Rather, the 
court of appeals examined the plea-taking proceeding for error: "Because the trial court 
committed plain error in advising [Dean] of his rights, we reverse (the denial of Dean's 
motion to withdraw his plea, vacate his conviction] and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion." !d. at~ 13 (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). 
The court of appeals justified the expansion of its scope of review by reference to 
"plain error." !d. at~ 10. The "plain error" doctrine permits, under limited 
circumstances, the review ofunpreserved error. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. It is not 
however a theoretical basis for expanding the scope of review. In other words, it is 
4Th is Court's decisions dictate that review of the denial of a motion to withdraw 
shall be for an abuse of discretion. In State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, 26 P.3d 203, for 
example, this Court held that "[t]he denial of a motion to withdraw is reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard, incorporating a clearly erroneous standard for findings of 
fact made in conjunction with that decision." !d. at~ 14. A trial court cannot abuse its 
discretion when it fails to address a claim not presented. The court of appeals' decision 
below is therefore inconsistent with Martinez and other decisions by this Court mandating 
that the denial of a motion to withdraw be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., 
State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, ~ 10,983 P.2d 556; State v. Holland, 921 P.2d430, 433 
(Utah 1996). 
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possible that a defendant might demonstrate plain error in a trial court's actions denying a 
motion to withdraw. A defendant might demonstrate that a trial court plainly erred in 
denying a motion to withdraw where "good cause" should have been obvious to the trial 
court ruling on the motion to withdraw, even though defendant did not specify it as a 
basis for his motion. "Good cause" might, for example, have been evident in the 
argument or documentation supporting the motion to withdraw. 
But no obvious error occurs in the trial court's proceedings on the motion to 
withdraw simply because error occurred at an earlier plea-taking. Even if the trial judge 
acting on the motion to withdraw is the same judge who took the plea, he does not 
commit plain error at the motion to withdraw because he fails to remember some 
unspecified error that m~y have occurred during the plea-taking. 
In its decision, the court of appeals misapplied the plain error doctrine and 
exceeded the appropriate scope of appellate review. The court of appeals did not 
determine and could not have concluded that the trial court "plainly erred" in denying the 
motion to withdraw. Rather, it improperly determined that the trial court "plainly erred" 
in taking defendant's plea. Dean, 2002 UT App 323 at~ 12. The court of appeals' plain 
error analysis disregards the plea statute, the mandates implicit in Reyes, Johnson, and 
Summers, its jurisdictional limits, and the dictates of sound policy. Its plain error analysis 
makes the motion for withdrawal of a plea, as required under statute and by the decisions 
of this Court, perfunctory. 
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Here, defendant filed a motion to \vithdraw. He raised two claims. First, he 
claimed that he had not been informed of the time limit for filing his motion. The trial 
court properly concluded that defendant had, indeed, been advised of the time limit. The 
trial court neither erred nor plainly erred in rejecting this basis for the motion to 
withdraw. 
Second, defendant claimed that "two significant departures" had occurred at the 
plea-taking. R. 43. He did not indicate \vhat those departures were. !d. The record does 
not indicate that the trial court had any information before it, other than the bald 
allegation that some rule 11 (e) error had twice occurred. The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the motion. Neither did the trial court plainly err when it found no 
showing of"good cause:' to support the motion to withdraw. To hold otherwise would be 
to render the motion to withdraw an empty formality. It would permit defendants to file 
skeleton motions, merely alleging error, knowing that they could later flesh out their 
claims on appeal.5 
5 Appellate review of a trial court's rulings on a motion is generally limited in 
scope. This can be seen most clearly in those cases where a defendant has no other 
avenue for appellate review. Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin (Melvin), 2000 
UT App 110, 2 P .3d 451, is illustrative. In that case, the trial court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Franklin. Melvin's appeal of that ruling was denied because it was 
untimely. Melvin later timely appealed the trial court's denials of two motions for relief 
of judgment under rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (mistake, newly discovered 
evidence, and misrepresentation). The appellate court explained that its "review of the 
trial court's rulings on these motions is limited in scope." !d. at~ 19. "An appeal of a 
Rule 60(b) order addresses only the propriety of the denial or grant of relief. The appeal 
does not, at least in most cases, reach the merits of the underlying judgment from which 
(continued ... ) 
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Point II 
THE TRIAL COURT STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH RULE 11 
\VHERE IT ADVISED DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY 
JURY, EVEN THOUGH THE COURT DID NOT SPECIFY THE 
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL BY AN 11 .. 1PARTIAL JURY 
Defendant argued below that the trial court did not strictly comply with rule 11 
when it advised him of his right to a trial by jury, but did not specify that he had a right to 
a speed_v trial by an impartial jury. Relying on its own precedent in State v. Tarnawiecki, 
2000 UT App 186, 5 P.3d 1222, and State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134,47 P.3d 101, the 
court of appeals agreed. 
The analysis by the court of appeals is inconsistent with this Court's decision in 
State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, 26 P.3d 203, which implies that the rule 11 standard is 
met where a defendant is advised of his right to a trial by jury, even absent mention of the 
words speedy and impartial. In Martinez, the defendant moved in the district court to 
withdraw his guilty plea, claiming it was not knowing and voluntary. !d. at~ 11. The 
district court denied the motion, and Martinez appealed. !d. at~ 13. On appeal, this 
\ .. continued) 
relief was sought. Appellate review of Rule 60(b) orders must be narrowed in this 
manner lest Rule 60(b) become a substitute for timely appeals." !d. (quoting James Wm. 
Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice§ 60.68[3] (3d ed. 1999) (first emphasis in 
Moore) (second emphasis in Melvin). 
These principles are applicable to appellate review of the denial of a motion to 
withdraw. A defendant has no right to directly appeal his plea-taking. He has only a 
right to appeal the denial of his motion to withdraw. Appellate review must therefore be 
narrowed lest appellate review of the motion to withdraw become a substitute for the 
otherwise proscribed direct appeal of the plea-taking. 
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Court held that the district court had "strictly complied with the constitutional and 
procedural requirements for entry of [Martinez's] guilty plea." including the mandates of 
rule 11. !d. at~ 26. This Court reasoned that "strict compliance with rule 11 (e) creates a 
presumption that the plea was voluntarily entered" and affirmed. !d. at~ 22 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). In so doing, the court opined that "the strict 
compliance requirement does not mandate a particular script or rote recitation of the 
rights listed. The purpose of rule 11 is to ensure that a defendant knows of his or her 
rights and thereby understands the consequences of a decision to plead guilty." !d. at~ 
22. The opinion observed, by way of background, that defendant understood his rights, 
among them, "the right to a jury trial." !d. at~ 4. In its analysis of defendant's rule 11 
challenge, this Court ag~in enumerated the rights that defendant acknowledged and 
understood, among them, "the right to a jury trial." !d. at~ 23. Although nothing in the 
case suggested that the trial court had used the terms impartial and speedy, this Court 
nonetheless held that the colloquy "strictly complied" with rule 11. !d. at~ 26. By 
implication, therefore, Martinez overrules the court of appeals' inconsistent decisions in 
Tarnawiecki and Hittle. 
Moreover, the record here makes it clear that the trial court did not ignore the 
mandates of rule 11(e). Defendant's rights were laid out in detail in the statement he 
made in connection with his plea. R. 29-35. The trial court ascertained that defendant 
had read and signed every paragraph of the statement. R. 71 :3. The trial court thereby 
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informed defendant that he had a right to "a trial by jury'' and that, in connection with that 
right, 
• he would have the right to confront the witnesses against him; 
• he had the right to have witnesses subpoenaed to testify in his behalf; 
• he could, if he so chose, testify in his own behalf; and 
• he could, however, choose not to testify, and the jury would be instructed 
that this could "not be held against [him]." 
R. 34; see also State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, ~ 12, 22 P.3d 1242 (findings may be based on 
plea affidavit). The trial court also instructed defendant that the State must prove every 
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and that the jury verdict must be 
unanimous. R. 34. Further, the trial court told him that by entering a plea, he would 
-
waive his trial rights. R. 33. 
The trial court's painstaking enumeration of defendant's rights sufficed to meet the 
requirements of rule 11(e)(3). The trial court's omission of the words speedy and 
irnpartial did not defeat the substantive goal of rule ll: to insure that defendant knew of 
his rights and understood the basic consequences ofhis decision to plead guilty. See 
Visser, 2000 UT 88 at ~ 11. 
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Point III 
ERROR, IF ANY, IS NOT "'PLAIN'' WHERE IT IS NEITHER 
OBVIOUS NOR HAAAIFUL. 
This Court has held that an appellant claiming unpreserved error must establish 
that error is plain, i.e., that (i) error exists, (ii) the error is obvious, and (iii) the error is 
harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). The court of appeals 
determined that the trial court's failure to explain that defendant waived his right to a 
speedy trial before an impartial jury constituted plain error, despite the absence of any 
showing of obviousness or harm. In so doing, the majority rendered a decision 
inconsistent with this Court's decision in Dunn. 
A. No "settled appellate law" made the trial court's error, if any, obvious. 
Error is not obvious "where there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial 
court." State v. Ross, 951 P .2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 1997). The trial court took 
defendant's plea on March 8, 2000, before either Tarnawiecki or Hittle was decided. 
R. 71. Therefore, the decisions in those cases could not have guided the trial court. 
B. Defendant demonstrated no harm. He has not shown that, but for the alleged 
error, he would not have pled guilty. 
The court of appeals did not require that defendant make any allegation or showing 
of prejudice under the plain error doctrine. Despite the absence of any claim of prejudice 
on appeal, the court of appeals sua sponte presumed prejudice simply "because the 
omission dealt with a substantial constitutional right." Dean, 2002 UT App 323 at~ 12. 
Citing its own case law which used the same presumption, the court of appeals reasoned, 
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"It is well established under Utah law that \VC will presume harm under plain error 
analysis when a trial court fails to inform defendant of his constitutional rights under rule 
11." !d. This decision has no basis in rule 11 precedent from this Court, and is contrary 
to this Court's interpretation of the plain error doctrine. Further, it is inconsistent with 
federal precedent which, while non-controlling, is persuasive authority. 
1. This Court's precedent 
To demonstrate that unpreserved error is plain, an appellant must show that 
(i) error exists, (ii) the error is obvious, and (iii) the error is harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
Plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel share a "common standard" of 
prejudice. State v. Lithe_rland, 2000 UT 76, ~ 31 at n.l4, 12 P .3d 92 (citing State v. 
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 n.l5 (Utah 1989)). A defendant claiming that his guilty plea 
resulted from counsel's ineffectiveness must show "'a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to 
trial."' Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516,525 (Utah 1994) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). Thus, a defendant attempting to show plain error under rule 11 must 
demonstrate that but for the trial court's omissions, he would not have pled guilty but 
would have insisted on going to tria1.6 
60therwise stated, defendant must establish that an obvious error so infected the 
plea-taking that the appellate court no longer has confidence in its underlying validity, 
because the plea was less than knowing and voluntary. Cf Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09; 
(continued ... ) 
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This is the tenor of the opinion in State v. Kay, 717 P .2d 1294, 1302 (Utah 1986), 
where this Court observed that technical violations of rule 11 should not automatically 
invalidate guilty pleas, reasoning that the "harmless error" rule is applicable. This Court 
stated: "If we were to hold that any violation of Rule 11 automatically voids the resultant 
plea, even when the plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered, we would encourage 
defendants, convicted and sentenced after such a plea, to attack their convictions for 
purely tactical reasons, either by direct appeal or by seeking habeas corpus long after the 
fact." !d. at 1301. Because Kay preceded State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), it 
did not address the interplay of the "harmless error" and "strict compliance" doctrines. 
Kay nevertheless clearly explains why policy concerns support treating unpreserved rule 
11 claims like all other unpreserved claims for purposes of plain error review. 
The court of appeals ignored not just Kay, but the whole body of plain error 
precedent when it presumed that any rule 11 violation causes harm. In his argument on 
appeal, defendant did not assert, let alone demonstrate, that the alleged rule 11 violation 
was prejudicial. He did not claim that he would not have pled guilty, had the trial court 
informed him that he had a right not just to a trial by jury, but to a speedy trial by an 
impartial jury. See Br. Aplt., Case No. 20000340-CA at 4-20; cf State v. Tenney, 913 
P.2d 750, 756 (Utah App. 1996) (holding defendant's "brief, conclusory statement" 
6( ••• continued) 
also Visser, 2000 UT 88 at ~~ 11-14. 
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insufficient to establish the prejudice required under the plain error doctrine). The court 
of appeals erred when it presumed harm. 
2. Federal precedent 
Precedent interpreting the federal rules of evidence i::; net controlling in thi, Js,~ 
It is, nevertheless, instructive. Federal ruk 11, like Utah r,llc 11, requires the trial court 
to advise a defendant of his rights before acceptmg a defendant's guilty plea. Fed. R. 
('r;rn D 11 (,-.\ T 1.,1;],., T Tt.,h'c ml., the federal rule has a Specific provision governing 
harmless error. rh._ relevant subsection provides: "Any variance from the procedures 
required by this rule which does not affect substantial nghts shall be disregarded. f'c:u. 
Advisory Committee ~2_te ( 1983 amendment). Thus, the Tenth Circuit has held, a rule 11 
violation "warrants reversal only if it had a significant influence on appellant's decision 
tO plead guilty·- -- ,,: -ff7fP' \.I f~i 
vililt:ti 0Wid 1-. lJuiiy, i)'):; l . .:..u ,IJ..:, ;V4 ~10th Cu. lYYUj. Otherwise stated, the 
reviewing court will '"examine the facts and circumstances of the ... case to see if the 
district court's flawed compliance,,,.; .. \.,. D .. l~ 1 1 mflv reasonabh· t.-e view,.~ '1<' 
plead guilty.-·· Lnited 
States v. Gigot, 14'7 f.Jd 119.3, ~ 198 (lOth Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 
1 F.3d 296,302 (5th C'ir 1993) (en bane) (in tum quoting United States~ ;, 
'J j4 i:' .La U"+'J, uou pm L tr. 1 'N 1) ~en Dane)). 
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The United States Supreme Court recently rejected a claim that error should be 
presumed in cases where a trial court violated federal rule 11. In United States v. Vonn, 
535 U.S. 55, 122 S. Ct. 1043 (2002), defendant pled guilty to armed bank robbery, 
conspiracy to commit bank robbery, and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence. 
!d., 122 S. Ct. at 1047-48. Defendant claimed for the first time on appeal that the trial 
court violated rule 11 by failing to advise him of his right to counsel at trial. !d. at 
1047-48. He argued that he had no appellate burden under the plain error rule to show 
prejudice, but that the State had the responsibility to establish harmlessness. !d. at 1050. 
The Supreme Court rejected defendant's argument, holding that a silent defendant 
carries the burden on appeal of affirmatively establishing some prejudice or detriment to 
the legal system be for~ ~enefitting from his silence at the plea hearing. !d. at 1046. In so 
doing, the Court recognized that rule 11 provides procedural safeguards which serve 
important constitutional interests in guarding against inadvertent and ignorant waivers of 
constitutional rights. !d. at 1050-51. The Court also noted that not all requirements under 
the rule are of equal importance relative to "the overarching issues of knowledge and 
voluntariness[.]" Jd. at 1052. The Court pointed to the rules governing entry and 
withdrawal of pleas, with their emphasis on addressing plea-related mistakes where those 
mistakes can be corrected easily and on promoting finality "in a system as heavily 
dependent on guilty pleas as ours." ld. at 1053-54. The Court found that relieving a 
defendant of having to establish prejudice under the plain error doctrine on appeal would 
undermine these important goals by permitting the defendant to "choose to say nothing 
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which time the burden would always fall on the Government to prove harmlessness.'' !d. 
at 1053. 
Utah's rule 11 contains nn harmless errnr nrnvisin 
lj". ,J\ 
.ioes. See Dunn, o:Su P.2J ul l2ub. Consequently, the analysis 
used by the United States Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit is a useful guide to the 
application of harmless error analysis in the rule 11 context. To show that a rule 11 
influenced or materially affected his decision to plead guilty. This is another\\ ay ,Jf 
saying that, but for the errors, he would lL t have pled guilty. 
Defendant made no recora m tne tnal court or wny ne aecwea to p1eaa guury ana 
how the court's omissions affected his decision. While he filed a motion to withdraw, he 
did not allege or argue that he would have gone to trial instead of pleading guilty had he 
only knowr he was entitled to a speed_\ ' Ui h:· :m impartial jury ~~·l t< ' 1 lw 
allege, let alone demonstrate, harm. He did not claim that, but for the trial court's 
omission of the words speedy and impartial, he would not have pled guilty. See Br. Aplt., 
1' 1 ~ . {"' . 1 • 
Illlll Ill uny way. ld. 
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CONCLUSION 
The court of appeals exceeded the proper scope of appellate review when it 
reviewed the plea proceeding for error not presented in proceedings on the motion to 
withdraw. The court of appeals erroneously concluded that a trial court's failure to 
specify that a guilty plea waives not only the right to trial, but the right to a speedy trial 
before an impartial jury, constitutes error. Finally, the court of appeals erroneously held 
that defendant had established plain error, where he had shown neither that the error was 
obvious nor that it was harmful. 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
court of appeals' decision and remand the matter to the court of appeals for consideration 
of defendant's remaining appellate issue. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on J!l_ May 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General . j 
c::£.4~ 
ssistant Attorney General 
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State v. Dean, .WU2 L f App 323, 57 P.3d 1106 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
S! n , ' · , Plaintiff and App( 
v. 
Wallace DEAN, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20000340-CA. 
Oc 
Defendant pleaded guilty in the Fifth Distnct l tll!rt 
Cedar City Department, Robert T. Braithwaite. J 
assault and felony and misdemeanor child abuse. 
Defendant appealed denial of motion to withdraw 
plea. The Court of Appeals, Jackson. P L held that 
plam error occurred at guilty plea colloquy when 
defendant was not informed of his right to a speedy 
; t.ll by an impartial jury. 
Reversed and remanded. 
· ;t Headnotes 
ill Criminal Law ~1030(1) 
110k1030(1) Most Cited Cases 
ill Criminal Law ~1141(2) 
11 Ok 1141 (2) Most Cited Cases 
To succeed on a claim of plain nror a defendant has 
the burden of showing: ( 1) an error exists; ( 2) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and 
(3) the error is harmful. 
ill criminal Law ~274(9) 
110k274(9) Most Cited Cases 
ill Criminal Law ~1026.10(3) 
ll Ok I 026.1 0(3) Most Cited Cases 
Defendant filed a timely motion to wahd1a,, ,.D 
guilty plea to child abuse, and thus Court of Appeals 
had jurisdiction to review argument that trial court 
committed plain error at plea colloquy by not 
advising defendant of his right to a speedy trial by an 
impartial jury, and defendant was not instead limited 
to attacking his guilty plea collaterally, even though 
he failed to specify the basis for his motion 
withdraw. Rules Crim.Proc., Rule ll(e). 
ill Criminal Law ~274(1) 
11 Ok274( I) Most Cited Cases 
Page 1 
If a defendant fails to file a motion to withdraw Ius 
guilty plea, he may only attack his guilty plea 
collaterally. 
HI Criminal Law ~273.1(4) 
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases 
T1ial ... uillt at gmlty plea colloquy is required to 
advise the defendant of his right to a speedy trial by 
an impartial jury, as opposed to merely informing 
him of his right to a trial by a jury. Rules Crim.Proc., 
Rule ll(e). 
ill Criminal Law ~1031(4) 
II Ok I 031(4) Most Cited Cases 
In child abuse case. tnai -:Pur! . ,;mmitted plain error 
at guilty plea colloquy by merelv informing 
defendant of his right to a trial by JUry, as it was 
required instead to advise him of the right to a speedy 
trial before an impart1al Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 
11 (e). 
*1106 J. Bryan Jackson, Cedar C1ty fo~ "ppe]b~• 
*1107 :'v1ark L. ShurtletT, Attorney ueneral, and 
Jeanne B. Inouye, Assistant Attorney General, Salt 
Lake City. fnr Appellee. 
Before JACKSON, D r ~,.-1 BENCH and 
GREENWOOD, JJ. 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Presiding Judge: 
BACKGROUND 
~ 1 On March :>, 2vUO, Uean pleaded guilty to one 
count of child abuse, a second degree felony, one 
count of child abuse, a class A misdemeanor, and 
assault, a class B misdemeanor. In connection with 
his plea, he executed a statement that detailed the 
constitutional rights he was waiving. Dean initialed 
each paragraph of the statement. Before accepting 
his guilty pleas, the trial court asked Dean if he had 
read the statement that he had executed and initialed 
each of the paragraphs. Dean answered 
affirmatively, and proceeded to plead guilty to the 
above-listed charges. Dean \vas not advised, either 
in his signed statement or by the trial court, that he 
Copr. .r:: West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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was waiving not only his right to a jury trial. but also 
his right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury. 
~ 2 On April 10, 2000, Dean filed a motion to 
withdraw hts guilty plea. He argued that the trial 
court failed to strictly comply with rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Crimmal Procedure in two ways. He 
first argued, incorrectly, that he had not been advised 
of the time limit for filing a motion to \vithdraw his 
guilty plea. However, the court did advise him of 
the thirty-day deadline. He did not spectfy the basis 
for the second violation. On April 11. 2000, Dean 
was convicted and sentenced after the trial court 
denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He 
appeals that denial and his conviction. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ill ~ 3 Dean argues for the first time on appeal that 
the trial court committed plain error because he was 
never advised of his right to a speedy trial by an 
impartial jury, as opposed to a mere trial by a jury. 
Dean filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, but 
on appeal challenges the denial of that motion "for 
the first time on appeal [on the basis] that the trial 
court failed to inform him of his right[ s] to a speedy 
trial" and an impartial jury. Stare v. Hitrle. 1 002 UT 
App 134. ~~ 5, 47 P.3d 101. Thus. he "must show 
[that the trial court committed] plain error. To 
succeed on a claim of plain error, a defendant has the 
burden of showing (i)[a]n error exists; (ti) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court: and (iii) 
the error is harmful." !d. (quotations and citations 
omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
I. J urisdict10n 
ill ~ 4 Before reaching the Issue Dean ratses, we 
address the State's argument that we lack jurisdiction 
to review Dean's plam error argument. In order to 
effectively address the State's jurisdictional 
challenge. we first sketch Utah's previous decisions 
relating to challenges to guilty pleas. 
W ~ 5 In State \'. Gibhon.1·, the supreme court held 
that "Rule 11 (e) squarely places on trial courts the 
burden of ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11 (e) 
requirements are complied with \vhen a gu1lty plea is 
entered." ~-W_P2d 1309. 131~ iltah 19S7).__l!]ilJ 
However, 
F~ I. "In Gihhon 1. this court adopted a 'strict 
compliance' test wh1ch superseded the 
'record as a whole' test traditionally applied 
Page 2 
on review in cases dealing with knowmg 
and voluntary guilty pleas." State \' 
.\faguire. 830 P.2d 216. 217 (Ltah 1991 ). 
[i]n Gihhon\ the Supreme Court determined that a 
defendant could not simply appeal a conviction 
based on a guilty plea. Rather. defendant must 
first file a motion to withdraw [his] plea. giving the 
court who took the plea the first chance to consider 
defendant's arguments. If the motion is denied, 
defendant could then appeal--not from the 
conviction per se, but from the denial of the 
motion. 
Summers \'. Cook 759 P.2d 341. 342-43 (Utah 
Ct.App.l988 l. If a defendant fails to file a motion to 
Withdraw his guilty plea, he may only attack his 
guilty plea collaterally. See id. 
~ 6 Once a guilty plea has been entered, a defendant 
has thirty days from "the entry of final judgment of 
conviction at the district *1108 court" to file a motion 
to withdraw his plea. See State \' Ostler, 2001 l(f 
68,,: 11 & n. 3, 31 P.3d 528 (Ostler ILl. We have 
previously held that the time limit on withdrawing a 
guilty plea is jurisdictional. See State l'. Price. 83 7 
P.2d_578. 582-84 (Utah Ct.App.l992 ). "Accordingly, 
if a defendant is advised of the deadline when the 
plea is entered, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to 
consider a motion to withdraw filed after the thirty-
day period." State v. Canfield, 917 P.2d 561 (lftah 
Ct.App.l996 ). Nevertheless, "in State v. Ostler. 
2000 lfT App 28. 996 P.2d I 065 (Qstlcr I ). this 
court recognized a narrow exception to the 
jurisdictional rule in Price. We concluded that 
although district courts lack jurisdiction under Price 
to consider the merits of untimely motions to 
withdraw guilty pleas, we may revtew alleged 
violations of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Crimmal 
Procedure ... for plain error." State v .. Melo. 2001 LT 
App 392.(1 4. 40 P.3d 646; accord State v. 
Tarnawieckt. 2000 LT App 186.'1 11. 5 P.3d 1222. 
~ 7 The supreme court recently eliminated this 
exception to the jurisdictional rule, stating that 
because the appellant failed to file a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, the court lacked jurisdiction 
to address his challenge to the plea, even for plain 
error. See State L Re-..:es 2002 UT l.i., ~I ~1 3-4, 40 
P.3d 630 ("This court may choose to review an issue 
not properly preserved for plain error. It cannot. 
however. use plain error to reach an issue over which 
1t has no junsdiction." (Internal citat1on omitted.)). 
Thus, the supreme court declined to hear Reyes's 
plain error argument. which directly attacked hts 
gmlty plea. See !!i_ 
Copr. c:: West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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~ 8 Citing Reves. the State asserts that because 
Dean's motion to withdraw his plea "did not claim the 
errors now alleged on appeal," his motion was 
somehow insufficient to allow appellate jurisdiction. 
Thus, the State argues that Dean's appeal amounts to 
nothing more than a direct attack on his guilty plea 
rather than a challenge to the denial of ht~ motton to 
withdraw. 
~ 9 However, in Reves. the supreme court dtd not 
address the sufficiency of a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea. Rather, it stated that the defendant must 
file his motion within the thirty-day deadline. See 
id. Unlike the defendant in Reves. Dean filed a 
timely motion to withdra\\ his guilty plea. Thus, 
although Dean failed to specify the basts for his 
motion to withdraw, the supreme court's ruling in 
Reves does not preclude this court from reviewing his 
plain error argument. Accordingly, we review his 
challenge under the plain error standard. 
II. Plam Error 
ill ~ 1 0 Dean argues for the first time on appeal that 
the trial court committed plain error because he was 
never advised of his right to a speedy trial by an 
impartial jury, as opposed to a mere trial by a jury. 
As we concluded in Hittle, which discussed identical 
issues, "[t]he trial court did" not strictly comply with 
rule 11 because it failed to advise Defendant of his 
right[ s] to a speedy [public] trial [and an impartial 
jury] either orally or in the plea affidavit. Therefore, 
the trial court erred." [D12] Hittle, 2002 UT App 
134 at ,1 6, 47 P.3d 101 (concluding the trial court 
erred after analyzing Tarnawiecki ). 
1:-Nl. l'he State correctly notes that "lsJtnct 
compliance ... does not mandate a particular 
script or rote recitation of the rights listed." 
State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88,•! ll, 22 P.3d 
1242 (Visser II). However, " 'the trial court 
[must] ... establish on the record that the 
defendant knowingly waived his or her 
constitutional rights,' " id. (citation omitted), 
to a " 'speedy public trial before an impartial 
jury.'" !d. at~ 10 (quoting Ctah R.Crim. P. 
J..lill). This is a greater right than a mere 
right to a jury trial. Thus, although the 
terms "impartial" .1nd "speedy" may be 
communicated by various means to the 
defendant, they may not be considered 
merely inconsequential modifiers to the jury 
trial right. Here, nothing in the record 
suggests the trial court established that Dean 
knowingly waived anything more that a 
right to a potentially partta I and delayed jury 
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trial. 
~ 11 The State argues that State v .. "vlartinez, 2001 
UT 12, 26 P.3d 203 "is inconsistent with the 
decision[s] in Tamawiecki [and Hittle ] and, by 
implication, overrules" them. It contends that 
"nothing [in J/artine=] ... suggested that the trial court 
had used the terms impartial and speedy, [yet] the 
[supreme court] nonetheless held that the colloquy 
'strictly complied' with rule 11." However, nothing 
in Martinez suggests that the trial court had not used 
these terms in the plea colloquy. Moreover, whether 
the rights these terms convey were communicated to 
*1109 the defendant in Martinez was not an issue 
before the court in that case. See id. Thus, we cannot 
say that .\fartinez overrules Tanwwzecki and Hittle. 
ill~ 12 Next, "m hght of [State v. l'i.1ser, 1999 UT 
App 19. 973 P.2d 998 (Visser I ), rev'd on other 
grounds by l'isser ll, 2000 UT 88. 22 P.3d 1242 
[FN3]] and Rule 11, the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court." Tamawiecki, 2000 UT 
App 186 at -I 18. 5 P.3d 1222. 
FN3. The dissent argues that "Tarnawiecki~~ 
reliance upon [Visser I ] is ... suspect given 
that Visser 1 was reversed by the Utah 
Supreme Court in [Visser II ]." However, 
Visser ll was decided on November 14, 
2000, after both Tarnawiccki, which \\as 
decided on June 15, 2000, and the trtal 
court's denial of Dean's motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea on \p11l II, 2000 Thus, the 
trial court in this case was sttll constrained 
by Visser f as of the date of its denial of 
Dean's motion to withdraw 
Moreover, the supreme court reversed V1.1~er 
l not because a defendant is not entitled to 
be informed of his right to a speedy trial 
before an impartial jury, but because the 
record in that case reflected that Visser had 
been informed of his right~ Tn Visser f/, 
the supreme court held 
that the trial court's colloquy, in light of the 
mid-trial context of the plea, provided an 
adequate basis in the record to conclude that 
the trial court strictly complied with rule 
II.. .. fT]he record details Visser's personal 
trial experience up to the point of his plea 
agreement. We conclude that 1111.., 
experience commumcated at least as much 
as would the mere oral recitation of the 
"right to a speedy pubhc trwl hefore an 
impartial jury." 
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~tate v Dean. 2002 UT App 323. 57 P 3d 1106 
I111E'1 II 2000 { 'T 88,• 13. 22 P 3J 12~2 
(emphasis added). 
In the present case, Dean's plea was not 
taken m a rrud-tnal context Because the trial 
court's colloquy was given m a nud-trial 
context and there was no mdicatwn that the 
tnal had been delayed. the supreme court m 
I 11 1 e1 I I assumed that VIsser had already 
received the benefit of his speedy trial nght. 
See ul Jt 4l 14 Similarly, the supreme 
court held that VIsser's partiCipatiOn m his 
own JUry selectiOn process was Instrumental 
m ensunng that his plea was voluntary. See 
1d at~ 16. In the present case, Dean's trial 
had not yet begun, and the JUry had not yet 
been selected Thus, we cannot say that the 
record m this case reflects "at least as much 
as would the mere oral recitatiOn of the 
'nght to a speedy public trial before an 
Impartial JUry' " !d at 4 13 
Fmally, the trial court's omission was harmful 
because the orrussion dealt With a substantial 
constitutional nght. It IS well established under 
Utah law that we will presume harm under plam 
error analysis when a trial court fails to mform a 
defendant of his constitutiOnal nghts under mle 11. 
See. e g , TamawzeLf..1 5 r' 3d 1222, 2000 L T App 
186 at ~~ 18 (presurrung harm when trial court 
failed to mform Defendant that she was entitled to 
a "speedy tnal before an Impartial JUry"); State ,. 
O~rler 2000 UT App 28.'1 'I( 25-26, 996 P 2d 1065 
(presummg harm where trial court fa1led to mform 
defendant that he would wa1ve certam 
constitutiOnal nghts by pleadmg guilty) . 
I-f IItle 2002 U f .\pp 134 at ,I 9. 47 P _\d I 01 (first 
citation orrutted). Accordmgly, the trial court 
comrmtted plam error by fa1lmg to advise Dean of h1s 
nght to a speedy trial before an Impartial jury [F~4] 
P\14 In light of th1s dec1s10n, we decline to 
address Dean's remammg arguments. 
CONCLUSION 
~ 13 "Because the trial court comm1tted plam error 
m advismg [Dean] of h1s nghts. we reverse [the 
demal of Dean's motton to w1thdraw his plea. \ acate 
h1s convtctJOn] and remand for proceedmgs 
consistent w1th th1s opm1on " 0_ Jt 4 11 
41 14 I CONCUR PAMELA T GREENWOOD. 
Judge 
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I3['-.JC'II, Judge (dissentmg): 
~ 15 I respectfully dissent. I cannot say that the 
tnal court "plamly erred" m not adv1smg Defendant 
of his nght to a "speedy" tnal by an "Impartial" JUry 
~ 16 To establish plam error a defendant must show 
that " '( 1) an error exists; (2) the error should have 
been obvwus to the trial court; and ( 3) the error was 
harmful. '")rate 1 Ross 951 P 2d .:'36. 238 (l tah 
Ct App 1997 \ (citatiOn orrutted) (emphasis added) 
"Utah courts have repeatedly held that a trtal court's 
error 1s not plam where there IS no settled appellate 
law to gmde the trial court" ld at 239, see also 
State v Braun. 787 P 2d 1336, 1341-42 (Utah 
Ct App 1990) (reJectmg a claim of plam error where 
" 'the trial court d1d not have the benefit of [a later] 
appellate dec1s1on' " (citatton orrutted) (alteratiOn m 
ongmal)) I disagree wtth the maJonty's conclusiOn 
that the tnal court's *1110 error m not advlSlng 
Defendant of his nghts should have been obv1ous to 
the tnal court m light of Stare > Hmle 2002 UT App 
Jl:L ___ 41._P 3d_jQ_!___ and State v Tarn a\\ wck1, 2000 UT 
App 186. 5 P 3d 1222. Both of these cases were 
dec1ded after Defendant m this case had entered h1s 
plea. Therefore, I fail to see how these deciSions 
could have been obvwus to the tnal court. 
Tarnawu:( k1's reliance upon State 1 I 11ser 1999 CT 
App 19. 973 P 2d 998. ( V1sser I ). IS also suspect 
gtven that h1~er f was reversed by the Utah Supreme 
Court m )tate l' f;[_, 1e1 2000 L'T 88. 22 P 3d 1242 
(fti\Ciff) 
~! 17 The law m this area remams unclear and 
unsettled There IS some questiOn as to whether we 
even have JUnsdictwn to address Defendant's mle II 
arguments. See L'tah R.Cnm P 11 Defendant 
entered h1s plea on March 8, 2000 and moved to 
withdraw 1t 33 days later, on Apn1 10. 2000. After 
denymg hts motiOn, the trial court sentenced 
Defendant on Apnl 11, 2000. State 1 01tler, 200 I 
l rr 68,,[ 1 1. 31 p 3d 528. held that "the thirty- day 
ltrrutat10n on filmg a motiOn to w1thdraw a plea of 
gu1lty or no contest mns from the date of final 
disposition of the case" and not from the date of the 
plea colloquy. However, m a later case, Srate £ 
RcH'\ 2002 t·T 13.'"1 3. 40 P Jd 6 ~ the Utah 
Supreme Court concluded that 1t lacked JUrtSdictlon 
to entertam the defendant's 11!.1~--H arguments 
because the defendant "did not mo've to w1thdraw h1s 
guilty plea w1thm thirty days ajter the entn of the 
plea" (Emphasis added.) Although Rn e\ c1tes 
o,rfu I cannot say that Re\1..'1 overruled o~rler See 
\wtc 1 l!cn::tt.'\ ~89 P 2d 393 '98-99 ( l t<~h 1994\ 
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State v Dean, 2002 UT App 323, 57 P 3d 1106 
( dtscussmg the standard for overrulmg precedent) 
~ 18 Furthermore, there 1s some questwn as to 
whether a tnal court must use the terms "speedy" tnal 
and "1mpamal" Jury, m order to strtctly comply wtth 
the reqmrements of mle 11 In State 1 lvlw tmez, 
2001 UT 12 ~[ 22, 26 P 3d 203 and h~~er II, our 
supreme court seems to mtend to overrule 
Tarnm11eck1 and 1ts progeny, but th1s was never done 
expressly I therefore cannot say that Tarnav.1eckl 
and Hittle have been overruled See Menzte~. 889 
P 2d at 398-99 
~ 19 In M w tmez the Utah Supreme Court 
concluded that the district court stnctly compbed 
with mle 11 by mformmg the defendant about "the 
nght to a JUry tnal" 2001 UT 12 at~, 22-25. 26 
P 3d ?03 No use of the words "speedy" tnal or 
"Impartial" JUry were needed to meet the 
reqmrements of mle 11 In V!Her ff the supreme 
court stated that "[s]trict compliance, does not 
mandate a particular scnpt or rote recitation of the 
nghts bsted" and "[s]tnct compliance does not 
reqmre a specific method of commumcatmg the 
nghts enumerated by mle 11 " h~~e1 II, 2000 UT 88 
at ~ ~ 11 13, 22 P 3d 1242 The court then 
proceeded to conclude that the tria1 court stnctly 
comphed with rule ll although It did not specifically 
mform the defendant of his " 'nght to a speedy pubhc 
trial before an Impartial JUry ' " fd at, 13 
~ 20 In contrast, Tm IUlllteLicl concluded that the 
trial court plamly erred when It fatled to specifically 
mform the defendant of her nght to a speedy trial 
before an Impartial JUry See Tarnav.reckr 2000 UT 
App 186 at , ~[ 16- 20 'i P 3d 1222 TmnmHeclc1 
rehed upon the court of appeals decision m V1.s.ser f, 
which the supreme court later reversed m Vts.seJ If 
Hittle then rehes upon Tarnawzeckr m concludmg 
that "the tria1 court [plamly erred by faihng] to 
advise [d]efendant of his substantial constitlttwnal 
nght to a speedy trial " Hittle, 2002 u T App 134 at ~ 
19_,_±7 p 3d 101 
~ 21 Because the cases m this area are so 
mconsistent, the supreme court should reevaluate the 
caselaw and set up some base-hne rules that are clear 
and easy to follow In so domg, It should expressly 
overrule mconsistent cases [FN l] 
FN l Controversies such as the one before 
us should be relatively easy to avoid as a 
practical matter The problem we now face 
could have been avoided If the plea 
agreement had exactly tracked the nghts 
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mentwned m rule 11 In the modem era of 
word processmg and computers, It would 
not be difficult to modify existmg forms (or 
prepare new ones) that precisely track a 
defendant's mle 11 nghts 
~ 22 Based on the foregomg, I cannot say that the 
tnal court plamly erred I would therefore affirm 
57 P 3d 1106, 457 Utah Adv Rep 11, 2002 UT App 
323 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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ADDENDUMB 
Utah Code Annotated§ 77-13-6 (1999) 
Withdrawal of plea. 
( 1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and 
with leave of the court. 
(2)(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion and shall be 
made within 30 days after the entry of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under Rule 65B, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Pagelof2 
•~u!e 1 1 ?!eas. 
(a) Ur;on arra1gnment e:xc<;pt ~cr an 1nfract::;n. ,, <J(':f(,nc!ant sh~ll he rcpv;scntecl tY/ c:,unsel. ""'ess the ddtmc;.ml 
·~·;alv(;s coun3'~i in o~Jen court. Tho <.!r.~tend~~~t ~r:a~! · h.Jt t_)(~ n;quired to ple~HJ until the c~eft.~r~d:~int has ~i;J(J a reasor~abie 
::m8 :o •:ont0r with c;unsel. 
(b) ;\ i;efendant mav l'lt~acl nnt r;u!it.v. q~.idt-7· . .... ~~ contest, :1at ouiity by n::ason vf ins21nit~·/ ... ::r (:ui!ty and rnentally ~ll. /\ 
t!efencant may f~iead i,, he :_>i!enatlve not quilt'. c.r net c;u:ity by reason of insanity. il a fiefen(lant c,swses to pleacl 01 1f 
a c1efendant ccrpcrntiOil t:;iis to ::'ppear, the, •,:r;t;:·t sn:111 enter ::1 plea or not ~-Juilty. 
\G) A defendant rnay plead no contest only wtth he consent of the court. 
(d) 1/Jhen a defendant (H1ters a plea of rot guilty. the case shall forth~:·,nth be set for trial. r\ delencant unable to mako 
bail si1ail t.Je given a !)reference for an ~:arly t~!al. :n cases other than felonies the court sl1a!l adViSe lhe defendant, or 
counsel. of the requirements for makinG :: ·nntten demand for a jury trial. 
fe) 1'18 G)Urt rnay rBfuse to ;Jccc:nt <J p!ea c 1 ;;uilty. i'O contest or gwlty and mentally iii. and :nay not accept the plea 
until the court hns found: 
( 1) if the defendant is not r<-'presented b11 counsel. Pe or she has knowinqly waived the l'iqht to counsel and does not 
desire counsel;. 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the ri~Jht to the presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, 
the right to a speedy puulic trial before an Impartial JUry, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the 
prosecution wttnesses. the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these 
rights arc waived: 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nmure and elements of the offense to which the olea is entered, that upon trial 
the prosecution would have t11e burden of provtng each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. and that the 
plea is an admission of all those elements: 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea . .A. factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the c:harged crime was actually 
committed by the defent1ant or, 1f tho (jefendant refuses or is otl1er.vise unable to admit cuioat)ility. that the prosecution 
!1as sutficiont evidence to estatJiish a substailtial risk of conviction: 
(5) t11e 11efend;:mt knows the mmimum and maxm~um sentence. and if applicable, the minunum mandatory nature of the 
minimum sentence. that may i}e unposed for each offense to which a p!ea !S entered, including the posstbility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences: 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been 
machcd: 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time ltmits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defent1ant has been a(1'/ised that the r·~}ht of appeal is limited. 
These findill~JS may be lx~sed on questionmg oi the dHfendant on the record or. if used. ::1 vmtten statement reciting 
these factors after tho ccurt has est:::biished th?.t the detendant has rE~ad. understood, am! acknowledqed the contents 
. d !he slatcrnent. II the rk:tonclant cannot u;'t1·?cstand the t=.:nqlish !anguaqc, it •.viii t>e sufficinnt th:ot !hn '3taternent has 
rx~en '"'ad or translated tQ ti;e Uclendant. 
Unle::> scecit:cally roqu;rerl :Ji' statute <H ruif' a .~out is 'lot rhqum'!rt to .:1quire ;nto or adv!SO .:orc':'rninfJ zmy collateral 
{:~.Jnst.!quences. tJf ~:1 p!t~a. 
l:j} ('1! lf if. ,:-·!~i-={·_:{~rs ~:1;~: Lilt) 
:;~:..::;r:1nc~·: ·.:i ;~ ·;tc:;:; L~ ~i :'::s~~(.:. ~.,. · 
.~>~ :·!:t·}rr.,'.:\ ··~r~/ (;~;-)t":'~'" : ·:l('-; r·(::s ·> ,re~·~d t:; · c·~.; . .lt:st ·.~: r~:Acon11n(:Jvl ~.liC 
\~t"':~>'. 1 ~~:; (~:::~rnis:-;;.11 (!: ! ;~n(·;: ~··:~ar :-=.·s. il1P ~~--~· ,;c;n1p:1t ~.n::1d be Cluprovc:f.1 
\~1) ( 1) T~~q judqf: --;h;.1!1 :l~Jt parr·~::~·;;~1~~"l .... ~Jit:~C1 ~:!::;c~:ssior~~; nnor tG ::Hly ~~lea C·lgrcenH:nt bt1!ng :nade hy the prosecutinq 
dttorm:y. 
(2) When :J tentative ploa ;oqr~::errent nas 1Jeen "P-<'ched. th8 judqe. dpon roquest of the part·es. may permit the 
OISciosum of the tf)l1t8tive ;:qrecnv:::r~l Y~d the rr:;:1sons for ;t. in advance: of the t1r~1e for tenc:9r of the piea. fhe 1udqe 
rn::]; thon inch:z<.te to the ;}rost::cut1nc; r~:t~-Jrrr.:y .. 1rJ dt=:fenss cou11sn! 'shotller the pro8csed dispcsition q;ill !)e approved. 
1:s) If the JUli(j'0 thc:n dcc:des t!1 :Jt f,:Fl ::;sr·ns1tion ::>t1o,_:ld nClt fir~ in confnrm1ty vvith thn ;)lea a~;reement. :he JUrJge •;hail 
dCJvi~e the cicfcnc\ant and tr1(m cc:ll u~:-.; c tr1c (:cfemi:,Jr1t to <:;tncr affim1 or Withdraw the plea. 
\;! w:t.h appn;·;c:l cf U<e court cH1(1 ~:'e :.~~:1snn 1 col U~t: n•cse<~':'l01l. :1 ckfendont may enter J condit:orwl plea oi qui!ty 
f;uilty and mentolly ,:, ur no c:omcsr. ''oserv1nq ,,, the :ec;orrl tt:e ''lJrlt on :Jppeai from tr1e :udqmcnt. to a rev1ew of the 
adverse derermm0tion ot ony spec•f: ::c pre-rnal mot1on. f.\ detendGnt who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to 
withdraw the plea. 
(J) Wilen a defendant tenders :1 plr!t" ,;f quilty anc.! rrentJiiy ill. in ald1tion to the other requirerr.ents of thts rule. the court 
shall hold a hearirg w1thin <~ reasop;;hlf: t:me to determ1rH~ :f the r!efendant is mentally 111 in accordance ·,vith Utah Code 
Ann.§ 77-1Ga-103. 
r -
AO'JISORY CCtJMITTEE NO fE 
These amendments are intended tc; r:;''ect current ';-r,v w1thout any substantive changes. The add1t1o11 of a requirement 
for ;,1 findinQ of :1 factu;"l lJas;s in s2cx·n (e)(4)!f3) tr;,cks federal rule 11 (f). ;m(i is ;n <:1ccorcance witl1 pnor c~1se law. 
'::.g St;1te v. Ereckenrid9e. 63fl P :,1 J.:!) (Utah r~<i)J). Th~! rule noN exp!icit!y recogn1z:es ple:-1s under North Carolina v . 
.'\iford. 400 U.S. 25, U 1 S.CL H30. ::.~' : __ :.:d.2d 1f';? ( 1l)'f0), anti sets forth \h(~ f:1ctual ~1<-1Sis requ1red for those pleas. E g 
Willf:tt '/. Bmnes. d-+2 P.2d 860 {:.Jt<lr ::_,,'?L 
·:110 :lrnencJrnonts t~xpHc:tlv recoqr'l.Z"~ tt:Jt p!r:a ;Jf·fidJvits. ·~vt1ure used. n1;;:y proi;e:!y bo inc~rporc~tt:d 1ntc the record 
when the trial court doter•nines :hat tl'P dnfondant t:e1s rnad (or been read) the affidav;t unclerstands its contents cllld 
dcknowledqos the contents. State -, i.i~1CjUirO. ':l3U ?.2li 21f3 (Utah F'91 ). Proper incorporation of pleCJ affidavits can 
save the court time. eliminate scrne c.f the n'Onf)tDny of rote recitations of rights Naived by pleading guilty and allow d 
more focused and ~JrO!)rng 1nquiry into che bets or the offense. the relationship of the law to those facts. and wl1etl1er 
the plea IS know:ngly and voluntarily entered. Tl1ese tJenetits are c:ontinqent on a careful and considered review of the 
affic!2.vit hy the r!.?fendant and proper ::.:re uy the tr;z!l cou11 tn •;erify trat such a review nas actually occu<'red. 
The final paragraph of section (e) ,:,arifics that the trial court rm~y. hut need not. advise detendants concerning 
col!ater;;11 consequences of a gt.;ilty :.;:ea. The failure to so ;,:Jvis<c: dccs net affect the validity of a plea. State v. 
r,1cf=CJdden ?384 P.2d 1303 (Utah Ap:; :0(-t.\) :~ert. denied. <392 P2d 1J (Utah 19D5L 
